Ameritopia: The Unmaking of America Read online

  Hobbes argued that men are equal in the sense that all individuals strive for survival. Even a strong man can be compromised by a confederation of physically or mentally weaker men. “Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the differences between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he” (74). The problem is when “any two men [of equal hopes] desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy or subdue one another” (75). Anarchy ensues as men cannot secure themselves from the collective force of other men and men can also seek to exercise power over other men. Thus, men have no pleasure but, instead, grief (75). “So that in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation” (76).

  In this state of war, where the individual seeks his own preservation, and where “every man [is] against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where there is no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of body, nor mind.… They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude” (78).

  Hobbes concluded that the state of man in the state of nature is a state of war. “[T]he condition of man … is a condition of war of everyone against everyone.…” (80) As such, man believes he has a right to everything, even to another man’s body. As long as man believes it is his natural right to everything there can be no security to any other man to live his full life (80).

  Hobbes famously declared, “Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (76).

  Yet there are also passions that incline men to peace, especially self-preservation. “The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement.” Hobbes argued there is “a precept, or general rule, of reason that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war” (78*).

  Hobbes described two Natural Laws of Contract—the transferring of rights to another in exchange for rights from another. First, man seeks peace and follows it, but when necessary defends himself. Second, man has to be willing to give up his right to all things and be content with as much liberty for himself as he would give other men (80). “To lay down a man’s right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same.” “Right is laid aside either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it to another.” Once a man abandons or transfers his rights he is not in the position to hinder the person who has obtained the rights from using them as they desire or see fit (81). Transferring rights can either be express or inferred (82). “Signs by inference are sometimes the consequence of words, sometimes the consequence of silence; sometimes the consequence of action; and generally a sign by inference of any contract [transfer] is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor” (83). “[W]hen a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust; and the definition of INJUSTICE is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just” (89).

  However, man requires a “power” to keep him in “awe” and make him fearful of punishment in order to restrain his tendencies. If no such power exists or if the power is not strong enough, men will revert to using violence and war. “[C]ovenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore … if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against other men” (106).

  To create a common power to defend men from others who want to harm them, and to provide security so they can live in peace and “contently,” requires that they “confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will … to appoint one man or an assembly of men to bear their person … and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgments” (109).

  “[E]very man should say to every man I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in a like manner.” The uniting of all under and into one is called a “Commonwealth” or the “great Leviathan”—that is, “that Mortal God to which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defence.” “And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth, which (to define it) is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence” (109). The person (or persons/assembly) who is the recipient of this transferred power is called the Sovereign. All others are his subjects.

  Sovereign power is obtained in two ways: either by Institution (where men agree voluntarily to submit to some man or assembly of men) or by Natural Force (through being more powerful than another or by using war to subdue enemies). (109, 110)

  THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY

  INSTITUTION ARE NEARLY ABSOLUTE:

  RULE I: Subjects cannot change the form of government. Subjects cannot “cast off” monarchy (the Sovereign), including making a new transfer of their rights to another without the monarch’s permission. (110)

  RULE II: Sovereign Power cannot be forfeited. Once the Subjects transfer their rights to the Sovereign they are his. If a Subject attempts to depose or kill the Sovereign any punishment to the Subject is a result of his own actions. Since the Sovereign by transfer is given the rights of the Subject, no Subject can be freed from his subjection. (111)

  RULE III: Since the majority has declared a sovereign, the minority must consent to the Sovereign’s actions. Whether he be with the majority or not, the Subject must either “submit to their decrees or be left in the condition of war he was before.” (112)

  RULE IV: The Sovereign’s actions cannot be “justly accused by the Subject.” The Sovereign acts under the authority of Subjects who have transferred their rights to it, who is to act justly and properly. However, if the subjects complain of injury from the actions of the Sovereign they have no one to blame but themselves. “They that have Sovereign power may commit iniquity, but not injustice, or injury in the proper signification.” (112, 113)

  RULE V: Whatever the Sovereign does is “unpunishable” by the Subject, as every Subject is responsible for the actions of the Sovereign, and so the actions of the Sovereign are as if the Subject committed them himself. (113)

  RULE VI: The Sovereign is judge for what is necessary
for the “Peace and Defence” of his subjects. He is the sole judge of the means of peace and defense. He determines what is necessary to preserve peace and security, and prevent discord at home and hostility abroad, and if lost to recover peace and security. The Sovereign is the sole judge as to “what opinions and doctrines are averse” or beneficial to the Commonwealth, who can be trusted to speak to the people, and who reviews all doctrines before they are published. (113)

  RULE VII: “[T]he sovereignty [has] the whole power of prescribing the rules whereby every man may know what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow subjects; and this is it men call property.… These rules of propriety … and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects are the civil laws.…” (114)

  RULE VIII: The Sovereign controls the judicial system—hearing and deciding all controversies concerning either civil or natural law. Ceding this power to the Sovereign would prevent man from settling disputes himself, thereby eliminating a condition that leads to war. (114)

  RULE IX: The Sovereign is the Commander-In-Chief who decides when to wage war and against whom, the size of the army and what weapons they will have, and the ability to tax Subjects for the cost thereof. (114)

  RULE X: The Sovereign chooses as he sees fit all counselors, ministers, magistrates, and officers, in both peace and war. (114, 115)

  RULE XI: The Sovereign can bestow riches, honors, and punishment (corporal or pecuniary) according to the law he has made or makes. (115)

  The Sovereign’s Rights (or Rules) I through XI are indivisible and inseparable since they go to the heart of the purpose of the Sovereign and Commonwealth—to protect the Subjects (115, 116).

  The Sovereign’s power must be absolute. “So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason and Scripture, that the sovereign power (whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular and aristocratical commonwealths) is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a power men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse” (135).

  LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS:

  • The liberty of man is consistent with the liberty from laws (covenants)—that is, the liberty of man to do whatever he wants to preserve his life if there is no commonwealth. Within the Commonwealth, liberty lies only in those things that, in regulating their actions, the Sovereign allows the Subjects to exercise, such as “the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit, and the like.” (138)

  • The Sovereign has unlimited power over Subjects. “[N]othing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury, because every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth.…” (138)

  • Liberty, which is praised by the Greeks and Romans, is liberty of the Sovereigns, not of private men (Subjects). For example, a commonwealth has the liberty to defend itself or invade other people, but the Subjects do not have the liberty to resist their own Sovereign. (139, 140)

  • Subjects have limited liberty to disobey a Sovereign command. A subject is not bound to a Sovereign command to hurt himself, or to “kill, wound or maim himself, or not to resist those that assault him, or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine or any other thing without which he cannot live.…” (142)

  • Only in cases where the Sovereign has “prescribed no rule” may the Subject act or forbear at his own discretion. “And therefore such liberty is in some places more, and in some less, according as they that have the sovereignty shall think most convenient.” (143)

  Public Ministers are appointed by the Sovereign to represent him in the Commonwealth and to the Subjects. These Public Ministers have either general administrative authority or special administrative authority. They also have the authority to teach or enable others to teach, including instructing people as to what is just or unjust. Public Ministers are also the judges appointed by the Sovereign. They execute judgments, publish the Sovereign’s commands, “suppress tumults,” apprehend and imprison “malefactors,” and generally act to preserve the peace. They also serve abroad to represent the Sovereign in all foreign matters. (155, 159)

  “DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS”

  • The Sovereign assigns each man a parcel of land the size of which is determined by the Sovereign. The Commonwealth is also assigned a portion. (162, 163)

  • The Sovereign controls all foreign trade and its distribution. (163)

  • The Sovereign decides all laws for transferring property, including borrowing, buying, selling, exchanging, lending, letting, etc. (163)

  • Using collectors, receivers, and treasurers the Sovereign controls the collection of money from the public and the dispersing of payments to the public. (164)

  Only the “Commonwealth” can make laws. Whether the Sovereign is a monarch or an assembly of men, they legislate and only they can legislate (173). The Sovereign is not subject to the civil law, including written and unwritten laws (174, 175). All laws, written and unwritten, need interpretation, and their interpretation depends on the Sovereign and those he appoints (180).

  Subjects are to be taught not to envy any form of government they observe in neighboring nations, for the success of the Commonwealth comes from the Subjects obeying the Sovereign. Any attempt to reform the Commonwealth will destroy it. Subjects are not to follow charismatic leaders or to dispute (“speak evil”) of the Sovereign power (222, 223). Days are to be set apart for Subjects to attend assemblies to learn their duties to the Sovereign (223). Universities are to teach the youth and give instruction from the Sovereign (225, 226).

  Those with strong bodies may not be idle; they are forced to work, with work provided by the Commonwealth. The poor but strong are sent to other countries not sufficiently inhabited to grow food in order to sustain themselves (228, 229).

  For Hobbes, man in his natural state is out for himself. He must be prepared to fight, and in fact fight, to preserve himself and that which is his. And he has a right to all he claims, as does every other man. In such a natural state, there can be no justice or injustice. Therefore, man is in a constant state of war with man. In essence, Hobbes is describing anarchy.

  Is anarchy, however, the true state of man in nature? Are there not occasions when man conducts himself honorably, morally, and civilly? Is man not also altruistic and compassionate? Do not most religions promote charity and selflessness? Moreover, even when acting in his self-interest, is it not in man’s self-interest to coexist? Hobbes acknowledges that man is also inclined to pursue peace, but he insists his primary motivation is the fear of war. But experience proves time and again that man can and does work cooperatively and peacefully, where property rights and voluntary arrangements are respected and enforced, not out of trepidation but affirmative free will. Man is influenced by love, loyalty, logic, and a wide spectrum of interests, rationales, beliefs, and emotions. He develops customs and traditions that lend themselves to an orderly civil society. Of course, fear exists among men in the state of nature. And it is a legitimate motivating factor, but it is not necessarily paramount or exclusive. Indeed, is not an all-powerful Sovereign, which is Hobbes’s answer, a greater and more certain threat to the individual?

  Furthermore, if man in the state of nature is subjected to “continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (76), then why, as Hobbes insists, would men voluntarily unite and contract with each other to form a government? How can each trust the other to live up to his commitments and join together in a commonwealth?

  Having united with each other Hobbes contends men will mutually transfer all their rights and liberties in the state of nature to a third party—that is, they will
surrender the ability to govern themselves to the Sovereign, and primarily out of fear. But will they? And in the Leviathan, why would they? Although Hobbes insists that the Subjects will be treated equally under the law and their rights protected in a stable and secure society, the Sovereign—whether one person or an assembly of persons—possesses absolute power. He is not to be questioned or challenged in a way that might be perceived as weakening the Commonwealth. The Sovereign may also use terror and coercion to enforce the law, for the greatest fear is the potential for strife, conflict, and civil war. Consequently, the individual would be surrendering his rights and liberties to an all-powerful, centralized mastermind who Hobbes argues will behave prudently and judiciously—a benevolent dictator, if you will. Again, history suggests otherwise. Such regimes wield power in a manner that serves their own purposes, not the best interests of their Subjects. Is not the Sovereign to be feared? Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile Hobbes’s distrust for the individual with his confidence in the altruistic nature of the individual or individuals who will oversee and control the Leviathan. Are not the latter also of flesh and blood? Hobbes seems to be saying that man’s nature cannot be trusted but the nature of a ruler or a ruling assembly of men can be trusted. How so?